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Stealing the Islands of Chagos:
Another Forgotten Story of Colonial Injustice
by Claire Grandison,* Seema Niki Kadaba,** and Andy Woo***

F

or more than a decade, the UNROW Human Rights
Impact Litigation Clinic at the American University
Washington College of Law (UNROW) has been part of a
global effort to seek justice for the Chagossians, the indigenous
inhabitants of the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean. The
Chagossians’ plight is not wellknown, yet it repeats a familiar
narrative from the history of colonialism. The most well-known and
stark example is perhaps the Trail
of Tears, when the U.S. government
ordered the forced removal of the
Native American nations residing
in the southeastern parts of North
America. The world stood by as the
U.S. governement forcefully and
violently expelled tens of thousands of Native Americans from
their homes on a death march—to be resettled in lands west
of the Mississippi and never to return. Less well-known is that
merely a few decades ago, in 1967, history would repeat itself
when the U.K. forcibly expelled thousands of indigenous people
of the Chagos Archipelago from their homeland to make way for
a U.S. military base.

effect on broader policy issues beyond the immediate scope
of the litigation. The Chagossian case is an ideal impact case
for UNROW because it has far-reaching transnational effects
and implications for any population forcefully removed from
its territory, and it seeks to challenge continuing tolerance for
colonial takings. The case has also provided UNROW the opportunity to take
action through litigation, advocacy,
and education. Beginning with litigation, UNROW filed a lawsuit in 2002
in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia based on
claims of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; torture; deprivation of
property; and discrimination. Citing
the political question doctrine, which
prohibits courts from reviewing certain
executive and legislative decisions, the
court quickly rejected the case and held that it could not review
the actions of the Department of Defense, ruling that these
questions should be left to the other branches of the government. UNROW lost on appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court
denied certiorari.

The Chagossian case is an ideal
impact case for UNROW because
it has far-reaching transnational
effects and implications for any
population forcefully removed
from its territory[.]

Having exhausted all the litigation possibiliites in the United
States, UNROW initiated an advocacy campaign to seek a
political response to the Chagossians’ struggle. Fortunately,
UNROW’s advocacy campaign garnered the attention of the
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), an organization representing the black members of the U.S. Congress, because of the
colonial nature of the Chagossians’ removal and because the
Chagossians were primarily of African descent. For two years,
UNROW met with legislators from the CBC with the aim of
creating a congressional resolution that would establish a claims
tribunal to review claims of Chagossians harmed in the course
of their forced removal. UNROW made enormous progress with
the help of former CBC chairman Representative Donald Payne,
who became a champion for the Chagossians’ cause in Congress.
Unfortunately, Representative Payne passed away shortly before
he was set to present the resolution before Congress, and other
representatives from the CBC, who had previously expressed
interest, quickly dropped out seemingly due to the lack of political will and public support for assisting a population the United
States had helped displace.

Upon learning of the Chagossians’ efforts for justice through
the U.K. judicial system, as will be discussed below, UNROW
sought to hold the U.S. government accountable for its involvement in the forced removal of the Chagossians by spearheading
numerous initiatives in the United States based on the three
pillars of the clinic’s work: litigation, advocacy, and education.
UNROW seeks to address human rights violations through litigation, help clients challenge limitations on redress for human
rights violations in courts, and increase compliance with human
rights norms and practices. The Clinic’s essential mission is to
address human rights violations through the model of impact
litigation, which seeks redress for clients while having a positive
*Claire Grandison is a J.D. Candidate and a member of the UNROW
Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic at the American University
Washington College of Law.
**Seema Niki Kadaba is a J.D./M.A. Candidate, Class of 2014, and
a member of the UNROW Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic
as well as the Journal of Gender, Social Policy, & the Law at the
American University Washington College of Law.

Nevertheless, UNROW’s advocacy and education efforts
on the Chagossians’ behalf did not end there. UNROW organized many community events to raise awareness about the
Chagossians, including teach-ins and film screenings, and clinic
members traveled to Mauritius numerous times to meet with

***Andy Woo is an alumnus of the American University Washington
College of Law, where he graduated with honors in 2013, and was
a member of the UNROW Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic as
well as the Moot Court Honor Society.
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the exiled Chagossian community. UNROW also continued to
support the litigation and political advocacy efforts of our
partners abroad. In support of a domestic U.K. case before the
House of Lords, R (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2), for example, UNROW
members traveled to London at the invitation of the U.K.
Parliament to make a presentation to the Law Lords and address
the House of Commons.

finding the case inadmissible. This article will argue that the
Court based its decision on rationales that threaten to not only
undermine the global campaign of the Chagossians and their
allies, but also damage the effort to strengthen international law
and hold governments accountable for human rights abuses. It
will further describe why the claim of the Chagossians to their
homeland has vast potential for impact, the crux of UNROW’s
mission, due to the relatively few decisions in the ECtHR on
indigenous peoples’ rights and the Courts’ limited jurisprudence
on collective rights to redress.

Believing that the plight of the Chagossian represents the
quintessential impact litigation case, UNROW continues to
take part in a global network advocating for the Chagossians.
Most recently, UNROW filed an online “We the People”
History of the Chagos Islands
petition with the White House, asking the U.S. government to
The Chagos Archipelago comprises 55 islands and is
redress wrongs against the Chagossians.1 More than 30,000
currently claimed by the U.K. as a British Indian Ocean Territory
people signed the petition within the thirty-day time limit. Yet,
(BIOT).4 From the 1500s to the 1960s, the Chagossian populadespite this overwhelming support for the Chagossians, the U.S.
tion consisted of families of African, Malagasy, and Indian
government failed to take
origin, mostly brought over
any responsibility for its role
as slaves to work on plantain ousting the entire poputions.5 These families and
lation from its homeland.2
their descendents made
The U.S. government waited
Chagos their home and by
until December 21, 2012,
the 1960s even the U.K.
more than eight months,
government recognized the
before responding to the
Chagossians as indigenous
petition, while, in comto the land.6 Nevertheless,
parison, it responded within
in the 1960s the U.K. made
a mere two months to a
an agreement with the U.S.
petition seeking funding for
government to forcibly
a Death Star.3 The response
deport the Chagossians in
to the Chagossians’ petiorder to grant the United
tion almost immediately
States access to Diego
followed the European
Garcia, the largest island,
Court of Human Rights’s
for a fifty-year term with
(ECtHR or “Court”) deci- Construction of a cinema in a village in Diego Garcia. Photo courtesy
the possibility of a twentysion in Chagos Islanders v. UK Royal Air Force.
year extension, to use as a
the United Kingdom, issued
military base.7 The authoriDecember 20, 2012, that dismissed the Chagossians’ claims as
ties employed brutal tactics to force thousands of the Chagossians
inadmissible. ECtHR decisions are influential in informing the
from their homes, including an embargo aimed at starving the
international community on the development of human rights
population, the mass extermination of the Chagossians’ pet
law, so it is likely not a coincidence that the U.S. government’s
dogs, and even death threats to any opposition groups.8 Today
response to the petition followed the ECtHR’s decision so
most Chagossians live in abject poverty on the island nations
closely. Had the Court decided on the merits of the case in the
of Mauritius and the Seychelles because they were forcibly
Chagossians’ favor, the U.S. government may not have issued as
removed from their home with little to no compensation and no
dismissive a response due to a risk of political embarassment.
ability to return.9
Due to the the prominence of the ECtHR, the Court’s decision
Following their violent removal, the Chagossians have
in this case has a significant impact on the global effort to seek
made
several unsucessful attempts to regain control of their
justice on behalf of the Chagossians and could have widespread
10 For example, in 1975 a Chagossian named Michel
homeland.
impacts on the claims of indigenous peoples and others forcibly
Ventacassen brought a case in the High Court in London conremoved from their homelands.
cerning the expulsions.11 The Ventacassen case settled in 1982,
The ECtHR is the sole transeuropean judicial organ with
and over the next two years, 1,344 Chagossians in Mauritius,
jurisdiction to hear petitions regarding state violations of the
only a part of the exiled Chagossian population, received GBP
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court’s decisions
2,976 each in compensation, a derisory amount in light of the
are binding on all members of the Council of Europe, including
magnitude of their loss.12 In addition, several families received
the U.K. However, because of the sheer number of petitions
no compensation and many staged hunger strikes to show
for review and the delicate balance with the Member States’
their disapproval of the failure of the U.K. government to truly
sovereignty concerns, the Court will only hear cases that meet
provide redress for their loss.13 The approximately 500
certain pre-conditions for jurisdiction. In the Chagos Islanders
Chagossians in the Seychelles who did not participate in the
case, the Court found that the pre-conditions had not been
negotiations received nothing.14 To receive the funds, the
met, and refused to hear the merits of the Chagossians’ claims,
38
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[The ECtHR’s] decision failed to protect the collective population’s rights and
set a precedent indicating that if certain members of a harmed population receive
compensation, then all other current and future members are barred from recovery.
Chagossians were required to sign renunciation forms written
in English, a language most of them did not understand.15

national court proceedings that could be construed as a denial
of access to court; therefore, the Court found the application
inadmissible. 28

In pursuit of full and adequate compensation and recognition of their struggle after the dissapointing 1975 judgement,
the Chagossians brought forced expulsion claims in a separate
litigation through the domestic U.K. courts, attempting to gain
a remedy and recognition. In a rare victory for the Chagossians,
in 2004 the U.K. court held that the orders, removing the
Chagossians from their land, were beyond the lawful powers
of the sovereign.16 In 2007, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
decision to pass the 2004 British Indian Ocean Territory Orders
was an abuse of power by the Crown.17 In 2008, however, the
majority of the House of Lords decided that the Queen had the
power to exile the entire population of the Chagos archipelago
because the British Indian Ocean Territory was not a settled
colony.18 In 2010, ECtHR began the investigation into the case
of the Chagossians right of return, yet this attempt proved to be
another disappointment.19

The impact of the ECtHR’s decision reaches far beyond the
Chagossians. The ECtHR could have set a precedent that would
protect the rights of indigenous peoples who have been expelled
from their land by colonial powers and provide them an avenue
for redress. Instead, this decision failed to protect the collective
population’s rights and set a precedent indicating that if certain
members of a harmed population receive compensation, then
all other current and future members are barred from recovery.
Beyond that, this decision indicated that colonial powers’ expulsion of indigenous or aboriginal populations would escape the
Court’s scrutiny as long as the colonial power makes a nominal
payment to the removed population with the condition that
acceptance of the payment functions as a waiver of the right to
return. This type of decision is particularly harmful to impact
litigators because it completely bars certain groups of victims
from ever receiving reparations.

The ECtHR Decision: Chagos Islanders v.
the United Kingdom—The Latest Denial
of the Chagossians’ Fight for Justice

The Court Found the Case Inadmissible because it
did not Grant Victim Status to the Chagossians

In Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR
delared the case inadmissible and thus declined to consider
the merits of the Chagossians’ claims. The ECtHR will only
hear arguments on the merits of a petition if applicants meet
certain preconditions of admissability.20 First, the cases can
only be brought to the Court after domestic remedies, such as
attempts for justice through national judicial systems, have been
exhausted.21 Secondly, the applicant must be a victim who has
suffered significant harm, and this harm must concern one of
the rights protected under the European Convention on Human
Rights (Convention).22 If an act or omission at issue directly
affects the applicant then he or she is considered a victim under
the Convention.23 Third, the applicant must bring the case within
six months of the last domestic decision and the claims must be
related to a right guaranteed by the Convention.24

The ECtHR based its finding of inadmissibility largely on its
determination that the Chagossians did not qualify as victims.
Under Article 34 of the European Convention, all individuals
who consider themselves victims of a breach of the Convention
can complain to the Court.29 To qualify as a direct victim, the
act or omission at issue must directly affect the applicant.30 The
Court has held that “[w]here applicants accept a sum of compensation in settlement of civil claims and renounce further use of
local remedies, . . . they will generally no longer be able to claim
to be a victim in respect of those matters.”31 However, the Court
has previously applied this standard to individual applicants
rather than groups. The Court’s decision created a disapointing
precedent that extends this individual standard to group litigants
without taking into account the special circumstances of a group
claim.

The ECtHR found the Chagossian case inadmissible for
several reasons. First, the Court held that because 471 of the
applicants had participated in the Ventacassen case and already
accepted and received compensation in the Ventacassen case,
none of the applicants could claim victim status.25 Second, the
Court held that the applicants who were not among the 471
who received compensation should have been aware of the
proceedings and made the appropriate claims; therefore, they
failed to exhaust domestic remedies.26 Third, the Court found
that applicants who were not born at the time of the settlement
were not residents of the island and accordingly had no claims to
“victim status” arising out of the expulsions.27 Finally, the Court
did not find any indication of arbitrariness or unfairness in the

As an impact litigation clinic, UNROW often advocates for
courts to apply legal standards that either do not yet exist or are
not widely used. In the present case, UNROW argues that the
Court should have developed a new legal standard to evaluate
victim status for group litigants rather than apply the rule that
denies victim status when an individual has participated in a
past settlement agreement. By failing to develop a rule based
on the unique circumstance of group litigants, the Court denied
hundreds of Chagossians the opportunity to seek redress merely
because some members of the group had previously received
nominal compensation.
The Court’s failure to take into consideration the unique
circumstances of group litigants does not only affect the
39
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Chagossians—it also severely limits all group litigants’ ability
to seek redress in the future. The Court denied the Chagossians
victim status because 471 of the 1,786 applicants received
compensation in the 1982 Ventacassen settlement.32 In reaching
this decision, the Court relied on previous judgements that
involved individual rather than group applicants. For example,
in Caraher v. the United Kingdom, where the Court found
that the applicant did not qualify as a victim because she had
accepted a settlement offer in the civil proceedings for the death
of her husband.33 However, the distinction between cases like
Caraher and that of the Chagossians is more significant than
the Court gave credit. In Caraher
the party in question did receive
some form of compensation yet
only 471 of the 1,786 applicant
Chagossians participated in the
earlier settlement agreement34—
the remaining 1,315 applicants
never received compensation and
some did not even participate.35
UNROW contends that instead
of applying a narrow ruling that previously applied to whether
invidiual victims were compensated, the Court should have
either identified a distinct rationale specific to large groups of
victims or, more appropriately, taken into account individuals
who never received any compensation.

the Court creates a legal standard for admissibility rulings that
will inevitably disfavor other groups seeking redresss.
The Court’s decision on this issue presents an important
advocacy opportunity because applying the Court’s narrow
understanding of who qualifies as an indirect victim would
restrict the rights of other such individuals or groups attempting
to gain access to the Court. Under this standard, the rights of
descendent family members of direct victims to access the Court
would be severely limited. Furthermore, if the Court is presented
with future cases in which an entire population has been forcefully removed from its territory, only members of the population
who actually resided on the territory at the time of removal would
be authorized to bring claims
before the Court. The Court could
better serve victims by utilizing a
broader reading of the definition
of victim in the practical guide
to provide access to justice to all
who qualify, as the current ruling
is harmful to the Chagossians and will certainly affect future
victims attempting to obtain justice through the Court.

The Court could better serve victims
by utilizing a broader reading of the
definition of victim[.]

The Court Should Have Protected the Chagossians’
Unique Rights as Indigenous Peoples
UNROW also uses impact litigation and advocacy to
strengthen compliance with international law. In that capacity,
UNROW argues that the Court in the present case would better
serve its role in defending vicims by providing the Chagossians
the special protection developed under international law to
protect indigenous peoples, as the Chagossians are the native
inhabitants of the Chagos Islands.40 International law, specifically the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the work of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination as expressed in General Recommendation XXIII
on Indigenous Peoples, has widely recognized the rights of
indigenous peoples.41 In 2007, the United Nations adopted the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration).42
Notably, 143 states, including the U.K., voted in favor of the
Declaration.43 Although the Declaration is not legally binding,
it serves as a benchmark for customary international law, and as
“a guide for the actions of the international human rights treaty
bodies.”44 The Declaration includes the “right not to be forcibly
removed from land or territories” and “the right to redress
for lands, territories, and resources which have been taken.”45
UNROW asserts that these principles of international law would
be effective guides for the Court to develop its jurisprudence
toward indigenous peoples.

Second, UNROW contends that when the Court denied
the applicants victim status by giving undue deference to the
Chagossians’ supposed waiver of their right to pursue claims
against the U.K. government, the Court acted inconsistent with
the European Convention’s purpose of protecting and defending
fundamental rights and freedoms. The Court upheld the validity
of the renunciation forms some of the Chagossians signed in the
Ventacassen settlement even though many of the signers were,
in the words of the ECtHR, “illiterate, Creole-speaking and
vulnerable and did not appreciate what they were signing.”36 The
Court deferred to the U.K. High Court’s earlier rejection of the
Chaggosians’ arguments, despite the High Court’s recognition
that many of the Chagossians were illiterate, “lacked significant
education,” and that “[l]egal concepts were, not surprisingly,
poorly understood.”37 By refusing to evaluate the validity of the
Chagossians’ waiver of their rights, the Court opened the door
for future groups to take advantage of vulnerable populations.
UNROW advocates for a more thorough evaluation of whether
the Chagossians’ waiver was knowing and intelligent.
Finally, the Court caused significant harm to the new generation of applicants, who are descendents of those expelled from
the island, by failing to view them as victims in this case. As
stated in the Court’s practical guide on admissibility criteria,
“[T]he Court may accept an individual application from a
person considered an indirect victim, where there is a personal
and specific link between the direct victim and the applicant.”38
The Court has developed a complicated jurisprudence for which
it is difficult to prescribe with precision what a “specific link”
means, but it is clear that family relationships play a signficant
role39 and the Court could have construed a broad definition of
“indirect victim” to include the “specifc link” of the descendants.
This decision has serious implications for future generations of
displaced persons because denying these Chagossians access to

The Court had persuasive authority for interpretion of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the work
of other regional courts, which have issued decisions that offer
a differing representation of these developing international
norms. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR), another regional human rights court that can
hear individual petitions against a state, has incorporated the
Declaration in its jurisprudence to provide indigenous peoples
the special rights required under customary international law.46
The IACtHR has read Article 21 of the American Convention
40
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on Human Rights to recognize the “close relationship between
indigenous people and their lands,” and has expanded on this
to protect the rights of indigenous people, despite the lack of a
clear statement of what those rights entail under the American
Convention.47 In Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the
IACtHR found that “the Ecuadorian state violated the [Sarayaku
Indigenous] community’s right to be consulted, as well as their
community property rights and their cultural identity.”48 The
IACtHR’s ruling was based in part on the right to property laid
out in the American Convention on Human Rights, which states,
“No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment
of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social
interest, and . . . according to the forms established by law.”49
The European Convention provides an almost identical right to
property and thus the IACtHR standards would provide an effective template for interpretation of customary international law.50

Court found that the Chagossians “could no longer claim to be
victims”53 merely because the U.K. government offered them
incomplete and nominal compensation. While the Chagossians
accepted the compensation, the harm done to them has yet to be
sufficiently redressed.
In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized the supposed
adequate compensation given to some of the Chagossians, many
of which were not part of the ECtHR litigation, as well as their
supposed renunciation of their right to return to their homeland.
The situation echoed familiar narratives from the colonial era
in European history, when indigenous populations were offered
nominal and incomplete compensation, in the absence of choice,
for the forceful taking of their homelands. Once this payment
was accepted—even if absent choice or consensus from the
entire populace—the colonial power treated the indigenous
population as having renounced
their rights to return to their
homeland. By ruling that the
U.K.’s nominal payment to only
part of the forcibly removed population is sufficient to preempt
the Chagossians from bringing
their claim before the ECtHR,
the Court’s ruling essentially
endorsed this colonial mentality
and behavior.

By incorporating the specicial
protection that international law
affords indigenous peoples in its
jurisprudence, the ECtHR would
ensure that Chagossians and other
indigenous groups have access
to redress for the full extent
of the harm inflicted against
them. Similar to the IACtHR,
the ECtHR has the responsibilty
to recognize the importance of
indigenous communities’ right
to be consulted and communaly
owned property.51 Expanding the ECtHR’s current interpretation
of property rights would benefit the Chagossians as well as
other indigenous groups seeking recognition of their unique and
longstanding rights related to their territory.

By ruling that the U.K.’s nominal
payment . . . is sufficient to preempt
the Chagossians from bringing their
claim before the ECtHR, the Court’s
ruling essentially endorsed this
colonial mentality and behavior.

Under this ruling, a colonial
power, such as the U.K., could
legally remove an indigenous
population from its homeland as long as the colonial power
makes a symbolic payment, even if this payment does not
actually remedy the losses, damages, or injuries incurred.
Furthermore, this ruling allows the colonial power to bar the
victims’ claims by assuming informed consent where the
victims accepted payment and waiver, and does not require
the Court to take into account the factual circumstances such
as a lack of comprehension due to language barriers, and does
not require the Court to look at the amount of payment offered
compared to the amount of harm done. Under this ruling, a
colonial power can make a waiver of claims a condition for
accepting the payment, as the U.K. did with the Chagossians,
even if the payees do not fully understand what they are signing
away because the Court will presume informed consent where
payment, waiver, and counsel were present. A better standard
would be to presume a lack of informed consent in these situations given the historic willingness of colonial powers to overtake
lands regardless of interests of the indigenous people. This is a
troubling ruling, considering the prevalence of wrongs that were
committed against indigenous peoples throughout history in this
context. The Court’s callous disregard for the Chagossians who
never received any compensation makes this decision all the
more disconcerting.

The Court’s decision not to consider the Chagossians’
rights as indigenous people once again demonstrates the case’s
importance within an impact litigation setting. The ECtHR has
had much less opportunity develop standards than the InterAmerican System, for which indigenous rights is one of its
more developed subjects. Much of the international guidance
on indigenous rights has come within the last decade, and this
case presented the ECtHR with a chance to follow the example
of the IACtHR and incorporate these relatively new principles
of customary international law into its jurisprudence. The
Court, however, failed to take advantage of this opportunity and
instead demonstrated its reluctance to strengthen customary
international law and guarantee indigenous rights.

The Court’s Decision Implicitly Endorses
Continuing Colonial Mentality Because the
Court Fails to Take the Claims of the Chaggossians
Into Consideration
a

Another troubling aspect of the Court’s decision, particularly
given the deference afforded to the U.K.’s supposed “compensation,” settlement of the Chagossians’ claims, and the failure to
recognize the protection that should be afforded to indigenous
populations, is the Court’s tacit endorsement of the underlying
colonial mentality. Although the Court noted the “callous and
shameful treatment which [the Chagossians] suffered,”52 the

Furthermore, the Court’s decision suggests that any colonial
power could simply give nominal compensation for the forceful
removal of a population and, in doing so, effectively foreclose
any claims that the victims would have otherwise been entitled
to under the Convention. This is a troubling holding that greatly
undermines the protection of human rights under the Convention
41
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Despite international recognition that forcefully removing a
poulation from its territory violates international law, the Court
implicitly endorsed a continuation of an all too familiar colonial
narrative. In reaching its short-shrift decision ruling the case
inadmissible, the Court found that an entire population had
relinquished their right to their homeland simply because the
colonial power had given them a nominal amount of compensation that came attached with an unknown waiver.
The Court should correct its approach and bring its jurisprudence in line with customary international law and other
regional courts to avoid further injustice. Indigenous populations receive special protection under customary international
law, and greater injustice could result if the Court overlooks
the problems in this decision and fails to adapt its approach to
conform with international standards. The Court will face new
claims from indigenous populations and other group applicants
and should change its analysis to ensure that other groups are not
denied the ability to obtain justice.

USS Saratoga moored at a port in Diego Garcia. Photo courtesy
US Navy.

and the legitimacy of the Court. UNROW, along with many
advocating on behalf of the Chagossians, questions whether the
Court’s rationale was based on legal principles or the Court’s
desire to avoid inflaming political sensitivities. Regardless of the
reasons for its refusal to hear the case on the merits, the Court
has now acted as a rubber stamp for a European power’s grievous
wrongs against an indigenous population.

This case is not the end of the legal road for the Chagossians,
nor the end of their struggle to return home. For example, the
lease on the Chagos Islands is coming up for review in 2016,
which presents an opportunity for the global community to rally
behind the Chagossians and inform the U.S. and U.K. governments that they must not continue this unacceptable colonial
practice. This grievous injustice needs attention, and it is up to
the relevant bodies to ensure that similar subsequent cases do
not follow this troubling piece of jurisprudence. Unfortunately,
world leaders can now point to this ECtHR decision and declare
that the Chagossians’ claims are, as ruled by the Court, invalid.
It is in situations like these that advocates of human rights
must persevere in the effort to advance the development of
international human rights law in a direction that leads to greater
protection for all individuals—including the little-known and
disenfranchised Chagossians who hailed from a forgotten island
in the center of the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion
The Chagossians’ story stands out because, unlike other
examples of colonial takings, it cannot be relegated to ancient
history. Thus, the Court’s careless treatment of the Chagos
Islanders v. the United Kingdom case is all the more relevant and
troubling. By finding that nominal compensation and unknowing
waiver could bar an entire population from seeking justice, the
Court did great damage to the development of international rule
of law with respect to the protection of indigenous populations.
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